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INTRODUCTION
Children are recognized as a vulnerable group because, among
other attributes, they are young, immature, impressionable, and
physically smaller than adults.1 These traits make children
particularly vulnerable to human rights abuses. As conflict ravages
large portions of the world, children are severely affected by the
fighting. Sadly, children are often forced to fight in these wars for
both governmental and non-governmental armed groups. Warring
parties often abduct children from their homes or internally displaced
persons camps and force them to fight—targeting them precisely
because they are impressionable and immature. When children are
forced to fight they are deprived of security, education, family, and
other needs essential for a stable upbringing. Child soldiers are
exposed to extreme violence and live in hostile conditions, which can
leave permanent emotional and physical scars.
Regardless of how children end up in armies and rebel groups,
whether through forced recruitment or “voluntary” enlistment, the
international community recognizes that children should not be
fighting wars.2 There are a variety of international and national
instruments that prohibit warring factions from conscripting
children.3 First, this paper discusses the global use of child soldiers,
1. See United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, pmbl., opened
for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990)
[hereinafter Convention on the Rights of the Child]; Declaration of the Rights of
the Child, G.A. Res. 1386, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1386(XIV) (Nov. 20, 1959);
Samantha Besson, The Principle of Non-Discrimination in the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, 13 Int’l J. Child. Rts. 433, 433 (2005) (noting that children are
especially susceptible to being targeted based on their gender, religion, or race).
2. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict art. 1, May 25, 2000, 2173 U.N.T.S.
222 [hereinafter Optional Protocol on Children in Armed Conflict]; Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) (defining children as persons under the age of
eighteen); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 77, June
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I] (defining children as
persons under the age of fifteen).
3. Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(c)-(c)(2) (2008);
Child Soldiers Accountability Act of 2008, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2442, 3300 (2008);
Optional Protocol on Children in Armed Conflict, supra note 2, art. 1; Rome
Statute, supra note 2, art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi) ; Additional Protocol I, supra note 2, art.
77.
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the legal framework regarding child soldiers, and state obligations to
protect the rights of children. Next, this paper argues that
international and national instruments create extraterritorial
obligations for states to prevent the use of child soldiers beyond their
own borders. Lastly, this paper examines U.S. extraterritorial
obligations regarding child soldiers and the country’s ability to
uphold its obligations.

II. THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS
Images of young children draped in bullets and carrying an AK-47
are increasingly common. Government armies and rebel groups
throughout the world have conscripted children into their armies,
forcing them to fight on the front lines, carry provisions, act as
couriers, and serve as sex slaves. The Coalition to Stop Child
Soldiers has reported that between 2004 and 2007 government and
rebel forces in twenty-one countries were using child soldiers.4 In
2010, the U.S. State Department reported that government forces in
at least six countries used child soldiers: Chad, Democratic Republic
of the Congo, Sudan, Yemen, Burma, and Somalia.5
Over the past ten years, Human Rights Watch has released
numerous reports documenting the use of child soldiers throughout
the world. In 2004, Liberian opposition groups and government
forces used approximately 15,000 child soldiers.6 Children were
4. COAL. TO STOP THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS, CHILD SOLDIERS GLOBAL
REPORT 2008 12, 15 (2008), available at http://www.childsoldiersglobalreport.org/
[hereinafter CHILD SOLDIERS REPORT 2008] (explaining that at least eighty-six
countries and territories still employ forms of recruitment of children under
eighteen).
5. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 10 (10th ed. 2010)
[hereinafter TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT]; cf. Howard LaFranchi, Obama
waives sanctions for four countries that use child soldiers, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (Oct. 29, 2010, 7:53 PM), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/ForeignPolicy/2010/1029/Obama-waives-sanctions-for-four-countries-that-use-childsoldiers (discussing President Obama’s waiver of sanctions on four of the six
recognized governments using child soldiers); Brian Knowlton, 4 Nations With
Child Soldiers Keep U.S. Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/29/world/africa/29soldiers.html (observing that
the only countries that President Obama did not waive sanctions for were Somalia
and Myanmar).
6. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HOW TO FIGHT, HOW TO KILL: CHILD
SOLDIERS IN LIBERIA 1 (2004) [hereinafter CHILD SOLDIERS IN LIBERIA] (noting
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kidnapped, sexually abused, forced to fight, and exposed to the
amputation of enemy fighter extremities. 7 In Nepal, the Maoist
rebels used children to carry provisions and ammunition to the
frontlines.8 The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri
Lanka recruited children as young as eleven years old to fight for
them.9
In Chad, Rwanda, and Uganda, government and paramilitary
forces have conscripted children. In Chad, Human Rights Watch
reported the use of underage children in various regions of the
country, and the U.S. State Department has said the same.10 One
Chadian boy said, “The village is not safe; it is better to go to war.”11
As in Liberia, children were forced to fight or were living in such
dire conditions that fighting seemed like a better option than staying
at home.12 During the Rwandan genocide, children were forced to
kill other children, steal property, and seek out people in hiding.13 A
reported 5,000 children were abducted by the Lord’s Resistance

that some military units consisted primarily of boy and girl soldiers under 18 years
old).
7. Id. at 2, 22-23.
8. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE: CIVILIANS
STRUGGLE TO SURVIVE IN NEPAL’S CIVIL WAR 60-61 (2004) [hereinafter NEPAL’S
CIVIL WAR] (discussing the Maoist effort to raise a militia of over fifty thousand
children to replenish depleted ranks).
9. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LIVING IN FEAR: CHILD SOLDIERS AND THE
TAMIL TIGERS IN SRI LANKA 2 (2004) [hereinafter CHILD SOLDIERS IN SRI LANKA]
(explaining that rebels forced parents to contribute at least one child to the
movement in order to avoid violent retaliation).
10. See TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 5, at 10; HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, EARLY TO WAR: CHILD SOLDIERS IN THE CHAD CONFLICT 17-19 (2007)
[hereinafter CHILD SOLDIERS IN CHAD] (reporting that some child soldiers are used
by Sudanese rebel groups that receive support from the Chadian government); see
also Knowlton, supra note 5 (noting that the government of Chad has recruited
refugee children for active armed conflicts against rebel forces).
11. See CHILD SOLIDERS IN CHAD, supra note 10, at 22 (telling the story of one
twelve-year-old boy who refused to idly “wait in the village to die” and instead
joined the combatants to seek revenge for the death of his family).
12. CHILD SOLDIERS IN LIBERIA, supra note 6, at 9 (explaining that some
children seek protection for their families by joining the forces that previously
abused them).
13. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LASTING WOUNDS: CONSEQUENCES OF
GENOCIDE AND WAR ON RWANDA’S CHILDREN 13 (2003) [hereinafter
CONSEQUENCES OF GENOCIDE ON RWANDA’S CHILDREN] (discussing that child
soldiers participated in the gamut of genocide by committing murder and rape).

2012]

EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS

617

Army in northern Uganda from 2002 to 2003, with the total estimate
from 1986 to 2002 reaching about 20,000 children.14
In the past, the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers has
criticized the United Kingdom, arguing that it has used child soldiers
by recruiting children into its army at the age of sixteen.15 Although
the U.K. signed the Optional Protocol on the involvement of children
in armed conflict, at the time of ratification it declared that the
government would deploy soldiers under eighteen in situations where
there is “genuine military need.”16 The U.K. has since deployed
soldiers under the age of eighteen to combat zones in Iraq.17
In regions throughout the world, children are forced into conflict.
Their minds are impressionable and exposure to extreme violence
can permanently harm the children if they are not first killed in the
conflict. The use of child soldiers has been condemned through both
international treaties and national laws that create obligations for
states to prohibit the use of child soldiers.18

III.LEGAL FRAMEWORK
In response to their widespread use, states have taken action to
prevent and punish the use of child soldiers. A variety of
international conventions and documents exist to prevent armed

14. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, STOLEN CHILDREN: ABDUCTION AND
RECRUITMENT IN NORTHERN UGANDA 2 (2003) [hereinafter STOLEN CHILDREN IN
UGANDA] (noting a dramatic increase in abductions in 2002 compared to 2001,
when fewer than 100 children were abducted).
15. Greg Barrow, UK ‘shamed’ over teenage soldiers, B.B.C. NEWS, June 12,
2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1383998.stm.
16. See Jo Becker, Children as Weapons of War, in HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
WORLD REPORT 2004 (2004), available at http://www/hrw.org/en/n
ews/2004/01/25/children-weapons-war (singling out the U.K. out as the only
European country that continues to send soldiers under the age of eighteen into
combat).
17. See Under-18s Were Deployed to Iraq, B.B.C. NEWS, Feb. 4, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6328771.stm (explaining that fifteen seventeen-year-old
soldiers were inadvertently sent to Iraq between June 2003 and July 2005;
however, no seventeen-year-olds have been deployed since July 2005).
18. Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(c)-(c)(2) (2008);
Child Soldiers Accountability Act of 2008, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2442, 3300 (2008);
Optional Protocol on Children in Armed Conflict, supra note 2, art. 1; Rome
Statute, supra note 2, art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi); Additional Protocol I, supra note 2, art.
77.
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groups from using child soldiers. International courts have also
issued arrest warrants and prosecuted individuals for the crime of
conscripting children.19 Although there are a number of instruments
and judicial opinions concerning child soldiers, the most specific
legally-binding instrument regarding the use of child soldiers is the
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on
the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (“Optional
Protocol”).20

A. THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD
The most significant legally-binding document regarding
children’s rights is the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(“CRC”)21 and its two optional protocols: one on the sale of children,
child prostitution, and child pornography,22 and the other on the
involvement of children in armed conflict.23 States negotiated the
CRC in November 1989, and less than one year later it entered into
force.24 There are currently 193 States Parties to the CRC, making it
one of the most signed treaties.25 The CRC defines children as
anyone eighteen years old or younger and recognizes the rights of

19. See Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-PT, Prosecution’s Second
Amended Indictment, ¶ 22 (Spec. Ct. for Sierra Leone May 29, 2007) (asserting
that Taylor’s actions directly promoted the abduction and use of soldiers under the
age of fifteen during the Sierra Leone civil war between 1996 and 2002);
Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-203-05-I, Indictment, ¶ 46 (Spec. Ct. for
Sierra Leone Mar. 7, 2003) (accusing Sesay of being a senior officer who directly
approved the use of child soldiers); Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon, & Gbao, Case No.
SCSL-04-15-T, Judgment, ¶ 6 (Spec. Ct. for Sierra Leone Mar. 2, 2009)
(prosecuting three individuals for “enlisting or conscripting children under the age
15 or using them to participate actively in hostilities”).
20. Optional Protocol on Children in Armed Conflict, supra note 2, art. 1.
21. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 1.
22. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict and on the Sale of Children, Child
Prostitution and Child Pornography, G.A. Res. 54/263, Annex II, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/54/263 (Mar. 16, 2001) [hereinafter Optional Protocol on Sale of
Children].
23. Optional Protocol on Children in Armed Conflict, supra note 2.
24. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 1.
25. Status of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N. TREATY SERVICE
(June 26, 2011), http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volu me%20I/Cha
pter%20IV/IV-11.en.pdf.
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children by creating legally binding obligations for States Parties.26
The Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed
Conflict is most pertinent to the issue of child soldiers. There are
currently 142 States Parties to the Protocol, including the United
States.27 States negotiated the protocol in 2000, and it entered into
force in 2002.28 The Protocol creates legally-binding obligations
regarding the prohibition of the use of child soldiers, and States
Parties are obligated to abide by all the provisions of the Protocol to
satisfy international law.29
The Optional Protocol completely prohibits the use of children in
conflict, defining a “child” as someone who is under eighteen years
old.30 The Protocol specifically provides that neither governmental
forces nor non-governmental actors may use child soldiers.31 Under
international law, because states sign treaties, they are normally the
ones that are legally bound by the treaties’ obligations.32 However,
since the use of child soldiers has been considered an egregious act,
and non-state actors often use children in their armies, this Optional
Protocol took the step of specifically including non-state actors.33
Human Rights Watch has systematically reported the use of child
soldiers by non-state actors in countries such as Uganda (by the
Lord’s Resistance Army),34 Sri Lanka (by the LTTE),35 and Nepal
26. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 1, arts. 1, 2.
27. Status of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child
on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, U.N. TREATY SERVICE (June 26,
2011),
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV11-b.en.pdf.
28. Id.
29. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (setting forth the principal of pacta sunt servanda that requires States
to uphold their treaty duties in good faith).
30. See Optional Protocol on Children in Armed Conflict, supra note 2, art. 1;
cf. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 1, art. 38 (prohibiting the
conscription of children under age fifteen).
31. Optional Protocol on Children in Armed Conflict, supra note 2, arts. 1, 2,
4.
32. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 29, arts. 6, 26; cf.,
e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 127 (2d Cir. 2010)
(holding that corporations cannot be held liable for violations of international law
because corporations do not sign treaties).
33. See Optional Protocol on Children in Armed Conflict, supra note 2, art. 4.
34. STOLEN CHILDREN IN UGANDA, supra note 14, at 2.
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(by the Maoists).36 These are but three examples amongst many
more, and the international community has recognized the fact that
states are not the only actors using child soldiers.
In recognition of this fact and the severity of the crime of using
child soldiers, states created the Optional Protocol to specifically
include an article referring to non-state actors. Article 4 provides that
“[a]rmed groups that are distinct from the armed forces of a State
should not, under any circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities
persons under the age of 18 years.”37 Recognizing that States, as
treaty signatories, are those responsible for treaty implementation,
the second part of Article 4 provides that States Parties must take
measures to prevent the recruitment and use of child soldiers.38
The Protocol spells out the steps that states must take within their
jurisdiction and sets forth the obligation of states to provide
assistance outside their jurisdiction. States must strive to ensure that
any children in combat are demobilized and reintegrated into
society.39 Article 7 provides that all States Parties to the protocol
must cooperate to ensure the complete implementation of the
protocol.40 State obligations include providing financial and technical
assistance to other States Parties and taking measures to prevent any
action that might be contrary to the Protocol.41 The idea of
“international cooperation” that is outlined in Article 7 is essential to
international law because it ensures that all States Parties help each
other uphold their obligations.

B. ADDITIONAL INSTRUMENTS CONDEMNING THE USE OF CHILD
SOLDIERS
Although the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of
the Child specifically addresses the use of child soldiers, a number of
other instruments incorporate articles relating to child soldiers.
35. CHILD SOLIDERS IN SRI LANKA, supra note 9, at 2.
36. NEPAL’S CIVIL WAR, supra note 8, at 60.
37. Optional Protocol on Children in Armed Conflict, supra note 2, art. 4.
38. Id.(“States Parties shall take all feasible measures to prevent such
recruitment and use, including the adoption of legal measures necessary to prohibit
and criminalize such practices”).
39. Id. art. 6.
40. Id. art. 7.
41. Id. arts. 6, 7.
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Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, relating to
international armed conflict, prohibits states from recruiting children
under the age of fifteen and requires that states take measures to
ensure that children under the age of fifteen do not take part in
hostilities.42 Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions,
relating to non-international armed conflict, imposes the same
requirements as the first protocol: states shall not recruit children
under fifteen to the armed forces and children under age fifteen may
not take up arms.43 The prohibition of the use of child soldiers in
these Additional Protocols is essential because the Geneva
Conventions and their Additional Protocols have risen to the level of
customary international law, meaning that all states are obligated to
abide by them regardless of whether they have signed the treaties.44
Additionally, the International Labor Organization Convention
Number 182 (“ILO Convention 182”) prohibits the conscription of
children into the armed forces.45 States negotiated the ILO
Convention 182 on the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child
Labor in 1999, and the Convention came into force in 2000.46 Article
3 includes the forced recruitment of children into the armed forces as
one of the worst forms of child labor, and expressly prohibits it.47
Furthermore, other instruments have been created regarding the
use of child soldiers. The UN Security Council has passed numerous
42. Additional Protocol I, supra note 2, at 77.
43. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art.
4(3)(c), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II]
(reiterating that even if children are deployed, they are still entitled to special
protections).
44. See Jean-Marie Henckaerts, The Grave Breaches Regime as Customary
International Law, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 683, 685 (2009) (asserting that the
Geneva Conventions are understood to be customary international law largely
because of universal ratification, and stating that it has “long been recognized that
treaty law can provide the blueprint for future behaviour and lay the foundation of
the development of customary rules.”).
45. International Labour Organization, Convention Concerning the Prohibition
and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour
arts. 1-3, June 17, 1999, 2133 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter Convention on Worst
Forms of Child Labour] (defining children as those under eighteen).
46. Id. art. 10; see Ratifications of Convention No. C182, ILO (June 26, 2011),
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/ratifce.pl?C182 (noting 174 states have ratified
the convention).
47. See Convention on Worst Forms of Child Labour, supra note 45, art. 3.
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resolutions calling on states to prohibit the use of children in armed
conflict.48 Additionally, in 2007, UNICEF and the French Foreign
Ministry held a meeting in Paris called “Free Children From War,”
where fifty-nine UN states participated and endorsed two outcome
documents that create political commitments for states to uphold.49
One of the documents is a series of commitments based on current
legal obligations regarding child soldiers, and the other is a detailed
set of principles relating to the protection of children from
participation in armed conflict and to the reintegration of child
soldiers into society after they have stopped fighting.50 The creation
of these documents and resolutions demonstrate both the UN’s and
states’ commitment to prevent the use of child soldiers and to assist
children who are forced to fight.

C. JUDICIAL PRECEDENT
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court contains
provisions relating to criminal accountability for recruiting and using
child soldiers in both international and non-international armed
conflict.51 The Rome Statute establishes a permanent court to try
individuals charged with war crimes, crimes against humanity,

48. See S.C. Res. 1612, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1612 (July 26, 2005); S.C. Res.
1539, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1539 (Apr. 22, 2004 (noting a lack of progress towards the
eradication of child soldiers); S.C. Res. 1460, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1460 (Jan. 30,
2003); S.C. Res. 1379, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1379 (Nov. 20, 2001); S.C. Res.
1314, ¶ 4, 11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1414 (Aug. 11, 2000); S.C. Res. 1261, ¶ 2, 13,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1261 (Aug. 25, 1999) (urging states to intensify their efforts to
end the use of children in armed conflict).
49. The Paris Commitments, Feb. 5-6, 2007, The Paris Commitments to
Protect Children From Unlawful Recruitment or Use by Armed Forces or Armed
Groups, ¶¶ 3, 4, available at http://www.un.org/children/conflict/_d
ocuments/pariscommitments/ParisCommitments_EN.pdf [hereinafter The Paris
Commitments]; The Paris Principles, Feb. 5-6, 2007, The Principles and
Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups, ¶¶ 3.113.13,
available
at
http://www.un.org/children/conflict/_documents/paris
principles/ParisPrinciples_EN.pdf [hereinafter The Paris Principles]; see generally
Paris Conference, Feb. 5-6, 2007, Free Children from War, available at
http://www.unicef.org/protection/files/Attendees.pdf (listing the 59 participating
countries).
50. See The Paris Commitments, supra note 49, ¶¶ 5-20; The Paris Principles,
supra note 49, ¶¶ 3.11, 3.12.
51. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi), 8(2)(e)(vii) (establishing the
recruitment of children under fifteen as a war crime).
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aggression, and genocide.52 Within these definitions, the Rome
Statute considers the recruitment of children under age fifteen to be a
war crime.53
The International Criminal Court (ICC) has tried individuals for
the crime of recruiting and using children under age fifteen. In
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, the first case before the ICC, the court heard
the case of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, who commanded rebel forces in
the Democratic Republic of Congo.54 The prosecutor accused him of
the war crimes of conscripting, enlisting, and using children under
age fifteen in non-international armed conflict.55 The fact that the
Rome Statute includes the use of child soldiers as a war crime and
the fact that the ICC tried someone accused of this crime in its first
trial shows that the international community considers the use of
child soldiers to be an egregious crime and that it is willing to punish
those who commit this crime.
The Special Court of Sierra Leone, a hybrid court established to
try individuals accused of war crimes during Sierra Leone’s civil
war, has also tried individuals for the use of child soldiers.56 The
Statute of the Special Court of Sierra Leone criminalized the use of

52. Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 1, 5.
53. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi). The Rome Statute uses the age of under fifteen
because it relies on the Geneva Conventions. Id. art. (8)(2)(a).
54. See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06,
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 9 (Int’l Crim. Ct. Jan. 29, 2007)
(charging Lubanga with “the war crimes of conscripting and enlisting children
under the age of fifteen years into an armed group . . . and using them to participate
in hostilities”); see also Lubanga Case, COALITION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=drctimelinelubanga (last visited
July 14, 2011); DRC: ICC’s First Trial Focuses on Child Soldiers, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (Jan. 23, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/01/22/drc-icc-s-firsttrial-focuses-child-soldiers.
55. Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 at ¶ 9 (alleging that Lubanga started
recruiting children in September 2002).
56. See Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone arts. 1, 4, Jan. 16, 2002,
2187 U.N.T.S. 145 [hereinafter SCSL Statute]; see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Taylor,
Case No. SCSL-03-01-PT, Prosecution’s Second Amended Indictment, ¶ 22 (Spec.
Ct. for Sierra Leone May 29, 2007); Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-203-05I, Indictment, ¶ 46 (Spec. Ct. for Sierra Leone Mar. 7, 2003); Prosecutor v. Sesay,
Kallon, & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Judgment, ¶ 6 (Spec. Ct. for Sierra
Leone Mar. 2, 2009); Prosecutor v. Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-03-12-I,
Indictment, ¶ 24 (Spec. Ct. for Sierra Leone June 24, 2003).
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children under age fifteen in armed conflict;57 the statute, however,
does not define the use of child soldiers as a war crime, but rather as
a “serious violation of international humanitarian law.”58 In 2007, the
Court convicted three individuals, Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy
Kamara, and Santigie Borbor Kanu, of committing war crimes
during the Sierra Leonean conflict, and of committing “other serious
violations of international law, including the use of child soldiers.”59
Charles Taylor, Issan Sesay, and Allieu Kondewa also stood trial for
the use of child soldiers.60 The provision on the prohibition of child
soldiers has been used against individuals who participated in the
Sierra Leonean conflict, showing a strong aversion to the crime and
the severe repercussions for its violations.
There are a vast number of widely accepted international
instruments, from treaties to resolutions, prohibiting the recruitment
and use of child soldiers. Furthermore, international courts have
upheld the existence of the international crime of using child soldiers
and have tried people specifically for this crime. The widespread
acceptance of an international norm prohibiting the use of child
soldiers shows the customary nature of the prohibition and the
universal need to uphold the obligation to prevent the use of child
soldiers.

IV.STATE OBLIGATIONS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Under international law, states have legally-binding obligations

57. SCSL Statute, supra note 56, art. 4.
58. Id.
59. See Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara, & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Trial
Judgment, ¶¶ 2113, 2117, 2121 (Spec. Ct. for Sierra Leone July 20, 2007) (ruling
that each of the three men were guilty of conscripting or using soldiers under the
age of 15 to participate in active warfare); Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara, & Kanu,
Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Appeals Judgment (Spec. Ct. for Sierra Leone Feb.
22, 2008) (dismissing all grounds for defendants’ appeals, thereby upholding the
trial court’s determination of guilt); Child Soldiers—Developments, COALITION TO
STOP THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS, http://www.child-soldiers.org/childsoldiers/leg
al-framework (last visited July 14, 2011) (reporting that all three defendants were
sentenced to over 45 years of imprisonment).
60. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-PT, ¶ 22; Sesay, Case No. SCSL-203-05-I, ¶
46; Sesay, Kallon, & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, ¶ 6; Kondewa, Case No.
SCSL-03-12-I, ¶ 24.
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that they must uphold. Traditionally, states are only responsible for
obligations in the conventions that they have signed. Therefore states
can voluntarily take on obligations and can only be held to the
obligations they have signed on to. Most treaties obligate states to
take action in support of, or refrain from taking action against,
people within their territory or jurisdiction.61 This is based on the
traditional notion of state sovereignty, whereby states are only
responsible for people within their jurisdiction.62 As this section
details, there are obligations that states must fulfill even though the
obligations fall outside the jurisdiction or territory of the state. These
obligations are called “extraterritorial obligations.”
The existence of extraterritorial obligations is not globally
accepted, and scholars note that these obligations are emerging as the
world becomes more globalized.63 The political and economic nature
of the globalizing world forces states to constantly interact with other
states. People continuously travel and migrate throughout the world,
seeking jobs, safety, and freedom. This globalization further leads to
the argument that states should be responsible for how their actions
affect people outside of their borders. This section outlines where

61. For example, Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights states that “[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect
and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the
rights recognized in the present Covenant” (emphasis added); disarmament treaties
such as the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel
Mines and their Destruction specifically obligate states to destroy weapons within
their jurisdiction and territory. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
art. 2, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Convention on
Cluster Munitions art. 3, May. 30, 2008, CCM/77 (entered into force Aug. 1,
2010),
available
at
http://www.clustermunitionsdublin.ie/pdf/ENGLISH
finaltext.pdf; Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production
and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction arts. 4, 5, Sep. 18,
1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211 [hereinafter Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines].
62. See Sigrun Skogly & Mark Gibney, Introduction, in UNIVERSAL HUMAN
RIGHTS AND EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS 1 (Mark Gibney & Sigrun Skogly
eds., 2010) (chronicling a shift from the traditional view of state sovereignty to a
modern view that recognizes the fluidity of state sovereignty due to globalization).
63. See id. (explaining that, in the past, international human rights law has
focused on what domestic governments are doing in terms of human rights;
however, in an interdependent, globalized world it is equally important to assess
the effect of other actors such as: intergovernmental organizations, international
private entities, and foreign states).
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extraterritorial obligations can be found and why there is an
extraterritorial obligation regarding the use of child soldiers.

A. GENERAL STATE OBLIGATIONS
Under international law there are three main actions that states
must undertake to uphold the rights of people in their jurisdiction:
the obligation to respect, to protect, and to fulfill each right.64 The
language creating each obligation is normally codified in a treaty.
The duty to respect provides that a state must refrain from
violating the rights codified in a treaty. Article 2 of the CRC begins
by stating that “States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set
forth in the present Convention to each child. . . .”65 The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights similarly provides that
“[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and
to ensure to all individuals . . . the rights recognized in the present
Covenant . . . .”66 The use of this language obligates states to not
violate the rights provided in those conventions. This means that if a
state signs the Convention on the Rights of the Child it cannot then
prohibit children from attending schools or accessing medical care,
which are protected rights within the Convention.67
The duty to protect provides that a state must try to avoid
violations of the rights set forth in a treaty by other individuals or
entities. The CRC addresses protection in Article 19 by stating:
States Parties shall take all appropriate . . . measures to
protect the child from all forms of physical or mental
violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment,
maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse, while in
the care of parent(s), legal guardian(s) or any other person
who has the care of the child.68
This language requires that a State Party take responsibility for
other actors—namely the parents or guardians of a child—to ensure
children’s safety. The state, therefore, is responsible for making sure
64. HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY 52 (2d ed. 1996).
65. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 1, art. 2.
66. See ICCPR, supra note 61, art. 2.
67. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 1, arts. 24, 28.
68. See id. art. 19.
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that children’s rights are not violated by third parties.
The duty to fulfill provides that a state must make remedies
available for violations of rights provided for in a treaty. The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for example,
provides that “[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant
undertakes . . . to ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as
herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy . . . .”69
A remedy would normally include access to a judicial system so that
someone who has had her rights violated can file a lawsuit and seek a
remedy, either pecuniary or non-pecuniary. To have a remedy
available, a state must have a functioning judicial system and
national laws that allow an individual to file suit regarding the
violation of her rights codified in the applicable convention.

B. EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS
While states have national duties to protect, fulfill, and
respect, they also have extraterritorial obligations. Extraterritorial
obligations are those obligations that a state owes to persons outside
of its territory or jurisdiction. One of the UN Special Rapporteurs
noted that, especially given our globalizing world, one country’s
action often impacts another country.70 Therefore, states should
ensure that their policies and actions will not result in human rights
violations in another country.71 An extraterritorial obligation, for
example, would include refraining from dumping waste in a river
that ends in another country whose residents would be harmed by the
waste.
In her article on state responsibility, Monica Hakimi notes that
there are three approaches to determine if a state has an
extraterritorial obligation.72 The decisive factors for determining

69. See ICCPR, supra note 61, art. 2 (requiring a remedy even for violations
caused by officials).
70. See Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, The Right to Food, ¶ 28,
Comm’n on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/44 (Mar. 16, 2006) (by Jean
Ziegler) [hereinafter Right to Food] (discussing the impact of national agricultural
policies on the right to food of individuals in other nations).
71. Id.
72. See Monica Hakimi, State Bystander Responsibility, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L.
341, 376-77 (2010) (recognizing extraterritoriality as one of the most contentious
issues in human rights law).
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extraterritorial obligations include the state’s: “(1) control over the
rights holder; (2) control over the territory in which the abuse occurs;
or (3) influence over the abuser.”73 Although the second approach is
widely accepted by human rights experts, Hakimi rejects the first two
approaches for too narrowly construing the theory of extraterritorial
obligations, and opines that the third approach proves the most
useful.74
The “influence over abuser” approach gives guidance in how to
determine a state’s responsibility to uphold its obligations.
“Influence” refers to a state’s ability to affect the actions of non-state
actors or another state, primarily through incentives or threats. If a
state has influence over another state or actor who may violate
human rights, the influential state has an obligation to prevent that
state or actor from taking illegal actions.

C. FINDING EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
INSTRUMENTS
Generally, the creation of an extraterritorial obligation can be
distilled from the language of certain treaties. The UN Charter
outlines the function of the UN and of all UN member states in
relation to UN goals and objectives.75 Most countries are UN
members, and every state party to the CRC is a UN member.76 In
terms of extraterritorial obligations created by the UN Charter, one
such obligation can be read into the language in Articles 55 and 56,
which must be read together.77
Article 55 and 56 of the UN Charter are contained in Chapter IX
regarding “International Economic and Social Co-operation.” Article
55 addresses the goals of the UN in regards to a variety of economic

73. Id.
74. See id. at 377-78 (noting that the third approach cures some of the
deficiencies in the other two approaches because it focuses on the state’s
relationship with the abuser and does not rely on the notion of control).
75. U.N. Charter art. 55.
76. Compare Status of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 25
(reporting 140 signatories to the Convention), with Member States of the United
Nations, U.N., http://www.un.org/en/members/ (last visited July 15, 2011)
(reflecting the membership of 192 states in the United Nations).
77. U.N. Charter arts. 55, 56 (instructing member states, in article 56, to take
action to achieve the purposes of article 55).
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and social issues. It provides that the “. . . United Nations shall
promote: . . . universal respect for, and observance of, human rights
and fundamental freedoms for all . . . .”78 Bruno Simma’s
commentary on Article 55 notes that the article contains a
“universality” aspect, which ensures that all states respect human
rights and that all “individuals should benefit equally from the
protection of human rights.”79 Article 56 provides that “[a]ll
Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes
set forth in Article 55.”80 Since Article 56 obligates all UN member
states to uphold, through whatever means possible, the provisions of
Article 55 including the universal respect for human rights, it can be
argued that this creates an extraterritorial obligation for states to
support human rights in other countries. This would then create an
extraterritorial obligation through which states must promote human
rights outside of their own countries.
Language regarding “international cooperation and assistance”
contained in treaties also creates extraterritorial obligations. Most
treaties contain this type of language to different degrees. The
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
provides that “[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes
to take steps, individually and through international assistance and
co-operation . . . with a view to achieving progressively the full
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all
appropriate means . . . .”81 In a recent article, Arne Vandenbogaerde
noted that scholars read this language to include extraterritorial
obligations “to respect, to protect and to fulfill ESC [economic,
social and cultural] rights in other countries . . . .”82 Since the

78. Id. art. 55 (emphasis added).
79. Bruno Simma, International Economic and Social Co-operation, in 2 THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 923, 924 (Bruno Simma ed.,
2d ed. 2002).
80. U.N. Charter art. 56.
81. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 2, ¶ 1,
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
82. Arne Vandenbogaerde & Wouter Vandenhole, The Optional Protocol to
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: An Ex Ante
Assessment of Its Effectiveness in Light of the Drafting Process, 10 Hum. Rts. L.
Rev. 207, 227 (2010) (documenting the highly politicized discussion around the
legal obligation to provide international assistance and cooperation).
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language provides for the progressive realization of rights through all
appropriate means, this includes taking measures to uphold rights–
and to refrain from violating rights–of people living outside a state’s
borders.
UN reports have also referenced extraterritorial obligations of
states. Although these reports are not legally binding, they are highly
influential and should be respected and upheld by states. In 2006, the
UN Commission on Human Rights released a report on “the right to
food” with a section relating specifically to extraterritorial
obligations regarding food access.83 The report discusses the issue of
international agricultural trade affecting some countries detrimentally
and advocates that states have extraterritorial obligations to respect,
protect, and fulfill the right to food.84 These obligations require states
to ensure that their policies do not lead to human rights violations
elsewhere, that actors within the state’s jurisdiction do not take
actions that will violate rights in another country, and that states are
supporting other countries’ ability to fulfill their right to food.85
These carefully outlined obligations demonstrate the UN’s
commitment to and support of the idea of extraterritorial obligations
to ensure that one state’s actions do not lead to the violation of rights
in another state.
Under customary international law, extraterritorial obligations are
not firmly established, but they are emerging.86 References to
obligations outside of a States Parties territory exist in international
conventions, and non-binding UN commentaries specifically discuss
extraterritorial obligations. This shows a rising acceptance of
extraterritorial obligations.

D. DOES THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL ON THE INVOLVEMENT OF
CHILDREN IN ARMED CONFLICT CREATE AN EXTRATERRITORIAL
OBLIGATION?
The Optional Protocol regarding child soldiers does create an

83. See Right to Food, supra note 70, ¶¶ 28-38.
84. Id. ¶¶ 35-37.
85. Id.
86. Hakimi, supra note 72, at 377-78 (recognizing that the approach to
extraterritoriality has often been based on confused reasoning and inconsistent
application).
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extraterritorial obligation for states. Primarily, states have an
obligation to uphold the right of all children to not be conscripted.
This obligation provides that states should take no actions that would
lead to another state’s or non-state actor’s use or recruitment of child
soldiers.
Examining the language of the Optional Protocol is essential to
determining the existence of an extraterritorial obligation to prevent
the use of child soldiers. Article 7 addresses the area of international
cooperation and assistance and states that all “States Parties shall
cooperate . . . in the prevention of any activity contrary to the
Protocol . . . .”87 The main provisions in the Protocol require a
prohibition on the conscription of soldiers under eighteen years old
by both states88 and non-state actors.89 It also requires States Parties
to create “legal, administrative and other measures” to implement the
Protocol within their jurisdictions.90 These provisions require states
to prevent the use of child soldiers within their jurisdiction.
Furthermore, reading Article 7 with the overall provisions of the
Protocol shows that States Parties commit to trying to prevent the use
of child soldiers in any country (“ . . . cooperate . . . in the prevention
of any activity contrary to the Protocol . . .”).
Using Hakimi’s “influence over the abuser” approach to
extraterritorial obligations proves useful in this situation.91 From this
perspective, a state that has influence over another state—by
affecting the other state’s actions—hereby has a responsibility to
promote the abidance of the treaty. In relation to the use of child
soldiers, if state A can influence the policy and activities of state B,
and both are States Parties to the Optional Protocol, then state A has
a responsibility to influence the activities of state B to ensure that
state B is not violating the Protocol. For example, if state A provides
military or technical assistance to state B, state A should not provide
this type of assistance if it knows that state B uses child soldiers.
Otherwise state A’s international assistance would actually promote
87. See Optional Protocol on Children in Armed Conflict, supra note 2, art. 7.
88. Id. art. 2.
89. Id. art. 4.
90. Id. art. 6.
91. See Hakimi, supra note 72, at 377-79 (discussing the application of the
influence-based approach to scenarios where the other two approaches proved to
be too narrow in scope).
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the use of child soldiers rather than prevent it and would thus violate
the Optional Protocol.
The theory of extraterritorial obligations comes up frequently in
regard to arms transfers. In 2006, the UN General Assembly passed a
resolution calling for an arms trade treaty to ensure that states
exporting arms were not exporting to parties outside of their
territorial jurisdiction that would use the weapons to commit human
rights abuses.92 The resolution acknowledged that arms control is
essential for maintaining international peace and security, and
recognized the detrimental impact that unrestricted weapons sales
can have on human rights.93
In a recent essay, Barbara Frey, the former UN Special Rappateur
for Small Arms and Human Rights, argues that an extraterritorial
obligation exists regarding the transfer of small arms and light
weapons.94 Part of Frey’s argument hinges on the right to life being a
peremptory international norm which, therefore, must be upheld by
all states.95 Barcelona Traction, an International Court of Justice
case, famously declared that the right to life is erga omnes, meaning
that it is an obligation owed to the international community as a
whole and that the international community as a whole has a legal
interest in upholding it.96 Therefore, according to Frey, the
irresponsible transfer of small arms and light weapons can lead to the
violation of a peremptory norm, which is impermissible under
international law.
Expanding Frey’s argument that the nature of the right to life as an
international peremptory norm creates an extraterritorial obligation
92. See G.A. Res. 61/89, ¶¶ 1, 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/89 (Dec. 18, 2006)
(establishing a group of experts to study the issue and draft the parameters of the
treaty).
93. Id. (considering the international legal structures protecting human rights
while proposing further restrictions on the international sale of conventional arms).
94. Barbara Frey, Obligations to Protect the Right to Life: Constructing a Rule
of Transfer Regarding Small Arms and Light Weapons, in UNIVERSAL HUMAN
RIGHTS AND EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS 35 (Mark Gibney & Sigrun Skogly
eds., 2010) [hereinafter Obligations to Protect] (looking to both the ICCPR as well
as arms embargoes).
95. See id. (recognizing that the right has been generated by both customary
international law and treaties).
96. See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v.
Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 50, ¶ 33 (Feb. 5, 1970).
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regarding arms transfers, the obligation to uphold the right to life
extends to preventing the use of child soldiers. In other words, a state
taking actions that would support the use of child soldiers in another
country should be seen as violating the peremptory norm of the right
to life. Due to the heightened probability of death for a conscripted
child, conscripting a child puts the right to life in more jeopardy than
conscripting an adult. Therefore, based similar to Frey’s argument
regarding the affect of weapons transfers on the right to life, there is
an extraterritorial obligation to prevent the use of child soldiers
because conscription of children jeopardizes the right to life.
There is widespread international condemnation of the use of child
soldiers. There are currently 142 States Parties to the Optional
Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, and the
U.S. government reported this year that it knows of only six
government forces that are using child soldiers.97 Since such a large
number of countries prohibit the use of child soldiers within their
own borders and recognize the horrifically damaging effects of
fighting as a child, it is illogical for these countries to not try, within
their means and without abrogating state sovereignty, to prevent the
use of child soldiers in other countries. This tends to show that the
norm of prohibiting the use of child soldiers, coupled with the
extensive treaty law preventing their use, creates an extraterritorial
obligation to prevent the use of child soldiers and protect children
from conscription.

V. U.S. OBLIGATIONS
The United States is a State Party to the Optional Protocol on the
Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed
Conflict, which creates legally-binding obligations for the United
States to uphold its obligations, and the United States has passed
national legislation regarding the use of child soldiers.98 This section,
premised on the argument that there is an extraterritorial obligation
to prevent the use of child soldiers, seeks to determine whether the

97. Status of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child
on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, supra note 27; TRAFFICKING IN
PERSONS REPORT, supra note 5, at 10.
98. Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(c)-(c)(2)(2008);
Child Soldiers Accountability Act of 2008, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2442, 3300 (2008).
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U.S. recognizes this obligation, and how it upholds the obligation if
recognized.

VI.DOES THE U.S. RECOGNIZE THIS
EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATION?
After signing the Optional Protocol, the U.S. Congress passed two
pieces of national legislation regarding child soldiers–the Child
Soldiers Prevention Act and the Child Soldiers Accountability Act.99
In order to uphold its obligations under the Optional Protocol, the
United States had to draft this national legislation. The language of
the two acts and the obligations created indicate that Congress
recognizes an extraterritorial obligation to prevent the use of child
soldiers. The acts sought to uphold this obligation in two ways: (1)
by restricting military assistance to governments using child
soldiers,100 and (2) by providing jurisdiction to U.S. federal courts to
prosecute people thought to have recruited or used child soldiers,
regardless of where these actions took place.101

A. LEGISLATIVE ACTION
The U.S. Congress passed the Child Soldiers Prevention Act and
the Child Soldiers Accountability Act in 2008.102 They are
progressive laws that prohibit unlawful conscription of children in
the U.S. and seek to prevent the use of child soldiers overseas. In
addition, these Acts promote the disarmament and reintegration of
children who are currently fighting.
The Child Soldiers Prevention Act prohibits the forcible
recruitment of anyone under the age of eighteen and the voluntary
recruitment of anyone under age fifteen.103 The Act permits the U.S.
government to provide assistance to child soldiers overseas in their
rehabilitation and reintegration into society.104 Most significantly, the
99. Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(c)-(c)(2)(2008);
Child Soldiers Accountability Act of 2008, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2442, 3300 (2008).
100. See Child Soldiers Prevention Act § 2370c-1(a) (prohibiting direct licenses
of military equipment as well).
101. See Child Soldiers Accountability Act of 2008, 18 U.S.C. § 2442(c).
102. Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(c)-(c)(2)(2008);
Child Soldiers Accountability Act of 2008, 18 U.S.C. § 2442 (2008).
103. Child Soldiers Accountability Act of 2008, 18 U.S.C. § 2442(c) (2008).
104. See id. § 2370c-1.
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Child Soldiers Prevention Act provides for “Prohibition”, meaning
that the U.S. government is prohibited from selling arms (guns,
tanks, bullets, etc.) to any government that the United States knows
to be using or recruiting child soldiers.105 The inclusion of this
provision shows that Congress was concerned with the ability of the
U.S. government to influence other states and intended for the United
States to curb the use of child soldiers by preventing military aid.
Unfortunately, the Child Soldiers Prevention Act also includes a
Presidential waiver that provides that the U.S. President may waive
the prohibition of sales of weapons to a foreign government using
child soldiers if it “is in the national interest of the United States.”106
This weak provision, amongst an otherwise strong bill, gives the
President discretion on whether to uphold the United States’
obligation to prevent the use of child soldiers in foreign countries.
The Child Soldiers Accountability Act provides extraterritorial
jurisdiction for the crimes of recruiting and using child soldiers.107
The Act criminalizes the recruitment and use of child soldiers and
provides U.S. federal courts with jurisdiction to try anyone thought
to have used or recruited child soldiers anywhere in the world.108
Concerned with state sovereignty and reciprocal behavior, the U.S.
government rarely recognizes extraterritorial obligations. Other
exceptions include the War Crimes Act109 and the Alien Tort Claims
Act.110 These statutes provide jurisdiction for crimes committed
outside the U.S., but they do so only for the most egregious
international crimes, such as genocide, war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and other breaches of the Geneva Conventions.111 The use
and recruitment of child soldiers has risen to the level of such an
egregious international crime and the United States has opened its
courts to try perpetrators.112 This is an important step in both
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Child Soldiers Accountability Act of 2008, 18 U.S.C. § 2442(c) (2008).
108. See id. § 2442(a).
109. See 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006) (criminalizing war crimes committed by or
against a member of the U.S. armed forces or a U.S. national).
110. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948) (creating jurisdiction to hear claims of
violations of the law of nations or of U.S. treaties).
111. See id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)-(d) (2006).
112. But see U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PERIODIC REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES TO
THE UNITED NATIONS COMMITTEE ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD AND RESPONSE
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stemming the use of child soldiers worldwide and showing States
Parties that the United States will hold violators accountable.
U.S. laws provide both for the prohibition of military assistance to
governments using child soldiers, and grants extraterritorial
jurisdiction for U.S. federal courts to try perpetrators. These two
essential steps demonstrate the U.S. commitment to curbing the use
of child soldiers outside U.S. territorial jurisdiction.

B. CONGRESSIONAL HEARING
To determine the intent of U.S. statutes, lawyers frequently look to
hearings and commentary made by members of Congress regarding
the provisions of a law. The Congressional hearings regarding the
Child Soldiers Accountability Act and Prevention Act was held in
2008. During the hearings, members of Congress listened to
presentations by three people—a former girl child soldier, the
Washington Advocacy Director of Human Rights Watch, and the
former Chief Prosecutor for the Special Court of Sierra Leone—and
discussed their own thoughts on the bills.113 The Representatives’
comments reflect the notion that the U.S. Congress understood there
to be an extraterritorial obligation regarding the prevention of the use
of child soldiers.114
Representative Robert Scott, the chairman of the subcommittee,
began with a discussion on the use of child soldiers worldwide—in
countries other than the United States—and why that is
unacceptable.115 He said that “this hearing will probe ways in which

COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS 19 (Jan. 22, 2010), available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/crc/docs/CRC.C.OPAC.USA.2.pdf
[hereinafter U.S. Report to U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child]
(recognizing that no court has yet exercised this jurisdiction).
113. See Child Soldiers Accountability Act of 2007: Hearing on S. 2135 Before
the H. Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2008) [hereinafter Hearings on Child Soldiers
Accountability Act].
114. Id. at 8, 10 (statements of Rep. Robert C. Scott, Chairman, Subcomm. on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec., and Rep. John Conyers, Jr., Chairman,
Comm. on the Judiciary) (recognizing the extraterritorial jurisdiction to prosecute
and prevent crimes of genocide as creating the same jurisdiction to take action
against the use of child soldiers).
115. Id. at 8 (highlighting the mass abductions of children in Uganda and Burma
for use as soldiers).
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we may, as a country, contribute to prevention and punishment of
recruiting and using child soldiers.”116 Because the United States
halted its practice of deploying soldiers under eighteen to combat
zones in 2007,117 this comment refers specifically to the United
States’ ability to prevent the use of child soldiers in other countries.
Representative John Conyers later said, “This bill brings the power
of the Justice Department to bear, in recognition that this is an
offense against international law that every country has a
responsibility to prosecute . . . .”118 Conyer’s statements that the
crime of using child soldiers requires universal jurisdiction furthers
the idea that the United States recognizes an extraterritorial
obligation. 119

C. UPHOLDING ITS OBLIGATIONS
The United States knows which governments around the world are
using child soldiers. In an October 2010 State Department report, the
United States noted that six governments are currently using child
soldiers: Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Yemen,
Burma, and Somalia.120 The United States provides military
assistance to four of these six countries.121 President Obama
specifically provided the waiver to provide military assistance to
these four countries. The United States does not provide any form of
military aid to Burma or Somalia.122 The U.S. government notes that,
because the Child Soldiers Prevention Act contains a waiver on the
prohibition of military assistance, its provision of assistance is legal
because the prohibition has been waived. The assistance, however,
goes against the general obligations of international cooperation,
created in the Optional Protocol, to prevent violations of the
Protocol. By providing military assistance to countries that the
United States knows are using child soldiers, the United States is

116. Id.
117. See Jeff Schogol, Marines under 18 no longer will deploy to combat zones,
STARS & STRIPES, Apr. 26, 2007, http://www.stripes.com/news/marines-under-18no-longer-will-deploy-to-combat-zones-1.63191.
118. See Hearings on Child Soldiers Accountability Act, supra note 102, at 10.
119. Id.
120. TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 5, at 10.
121. Knowlton, supra note 5.
122. Id.
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promoting violations of the Optional Protocol.
In January 2010, the U.S. government submitted its Periodic
Report to the U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child relating to
the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child
on Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict.123 The report
discusses U.S. implementation of the Optional Protocol in regards to
military recruiting and education, judicial actions, and international
assistance.124 The report notes that the U.S. War Crimes Statute125
does not explicitly refer to the crime of using and recruiting child
soldiers but that “depending upon the circumstances, the manner in
which children are recruited, used, or treated in hostilities could
constitute prohibited conduct under the statute.”126 The report does
not at this point reference the Child Soldiers Prevention Act, which
does criminalize the use of child soldiers.127
The report also includes a section on the provision of aid in
regards to U.S. obligations to fulfill its Article 7 international
cooperation and assistance obligations.128 Interestingly, this aspect of
the report focuses primarily on aid provided by USAID to foreign
programs that promote the rehabilitation and reintegration of child
soldiers.129 There is no mention of the prohibition of military
assistance to countries using child soldiers. Furthermore, the report
notes that there have been no prosecutions despite existing laws that
provide jurisdiction for such crimes.130
Additionally, the report includes answers to recommendations

123. See U.S. Report to U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child, supra note
112.
124. Id. at 2-27.
125. The U.S. War Crimes Act criminalizes a “grave breach of the Geneva
Conventions.” See War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2008).
126. U.S. Report to U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child, supra note 112,
at 24.
127. See Child Soldiers Accountability Act of 2008, 18 U.S.C. § 2442(a) (2008).
128. U.S. Report to U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child, supra note 112,
at 27-36 (outlining efforts in Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sri
Lanka, Uganda, Sierra Leone, Chad, and Burundi).
129. See id. at 28 (discussing programs primarily focused on reuniting children
with their families).
130. Id. at 19 (noting the short period of time between enactment of the laws and
the report).
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made by the Committee on the Rights of the Child.131 One
recommendation was to create an extraterritorial obligation within
national law to try individuals using or recruiting children.132 The
United States responded by explaining how the Child Soldiers
Accountability Act provides jurisdiction over persons who are U.S.
citizens or residents, stateless persons habituating in the United
States, persons who are present in the United States, and over any
crimes that happened partially or fully in the United States.133 This
response acknowledges the United States’ ability to hold non-U.S.
residents (“persons present in the U.S.”) accountable for crimes that
happened outside of its jurisdiction, showing the United States’
intention to prevent further use of child soldiers overseas and to deter
any violators from seeking refuge, or even visiting, the United
States.134 The Committee further recommended that the United States
become a State Party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child
and the Rome Statute and that the Senate ratify various treaties on
international humanitarian law that it has not yet accepted.135 To each
of these recommendations, the U.S noted either that it was reviewing
the treaty or that it had no intention of joining the convention.136
The United States has signed and ratified the Optional Protocol
relating to the use of child soldiers and has created national
legislation to uphold its obligations outlined in the Protocol. These
actions, coupled with commentary from Congressional hearings,
show the United States’ understanding that it has an extraterritorial
obligation to prevent the use of child soldiers and that it intends to
uphold this obligation. However, the presidential waiver included in
the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008 deeply undermines its
ability to uphold this obligation; the United States can provide
military assistance to governments it specifically knows use child
soldiers. Although the United States understands and apparently

131. Id. at 38-52.
132. Id. at 44.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 44-45 (calling for ratification of the Additional Protocols to the
Geneva Conventions and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their
Destruction).
136. Id.
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intends to uphold its extraterritorial obligations, it has failed to do so
by continuing to provide money, weapons, and training to foreign
militaries using child soldiers.

VII.CONCLUSION
The international community—states, NGOs, and international
institutions—have rejected the use of child soldiers. Most states are
party to one of many treaties (such as the Geneva Conventions,
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, ILO
Convention 182, and others) that prohibit the use and recruitment of
children into armed forces. Furthermore, international legal scholars
have acknowledged that extraterritorial obligations can be read into
some human rights treaties. Therefore, given the egregious nature of
the use of child soldiers and the widespread prohibition and
prosecution for their use, states have an extraterritorial obligation to
prevent the use of child soldiers. This means that states must not only
prevent the use of child soldiers within their own territories, but they
must also look beyond their territories to ensure that their actions do
not permit or promote the use of child soldiers in other territories.
The United States, as a State Party to the Optional Protocol
prohibiting the use of child soldiers, created national legislation that,
if implemented properly, would uphold its extraterritorial obligation.
The legislation gives jurisdiction to U.S. courts to try individuals
suspected of using or recruiting child soldiers and prohibits the U.S.
government from providing military assistance to foreign
governments that the United States knows is using child soldiers. In
practice, however, the United States is not fully upholding its
obligations. This year, President Obama waived the prohibition of
military aid to four countries the United States knows to be using
child soldiers. This action violates the United States’ obligations
under international law to prevent the use of child soldiers outside of
its territory.

